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different set of contradictory properties to him. On this account, at one and the 
same time Christ as omniscient knows that he is unable to sin and as human, 
having the epistemic possibility of sinning, does not know that he is unable to 
sin. It seems to me arguable that the reduplicative strategy applied to the traditional 
account of the two natures of Christ could show that in attributing both omnis-
cience and limited knowledge to Christ we are not attributing contradictory 
properties to one and the same thing. But if so, then the reduplicative strategy 
is also sufficient to show that in attributing to Christ both necessary goodness 
and the ability to sin we aren't predicating contradictory attributes of him either. 
My review has concentrated on the parts of Morris's book which are bound 
to be controversial, but that approach must not be allowed to obscure the substan-
tial achievement of this book. With admirable boldness, Morris has set out to 
defend one of the Christian doctrines which has always seemed most vulnerable 
to philosophical attack. He is obviously at home in dealing with both philosophical 
and theological literature on the subject, and his treatment of the doctrine's 
detractors is patient and fair. The presentation of his own account is beautifully 
clear and philosophically sophisticated, and he develops his position with 
ingenuity and subtlety. While I find problems in Morris's view of Christ as 
having two minds, the general strategy underlying this view, of compartmen-
talizing the divine and human attributes of Christ and predicating them of Christ 
secundum quid rather than simpliciter, seems to me certainly on the right track. 
Although there is much to disagree with in the book, then, it is nonetheless a 
model for the way philosophy of religion should be done. Not everyone will 
agree with Morris's interpretation and defense of the incarnation, but no one 
should ignore them. 
The Only Wise God: The Compatibility of Divine Foreknowledge and Human 
Freedom, by William Lane Craig. Grand Rapids: Baker, 1987, 157 pp., $7.95 
(paper), ISBN 0-8010-2519-2. 
Reviewed by WILLIAM HASKER, Huntington College. 
According to William Lane Craig, "today the Christian seeking after truth will 
probably learn more about the attributes of God from works of Christian philos-
ophers than from those of Christian theologians" (p. 11). In this volume he 
presents the results of philosophical work on the doctrine of omniscience, focusing 
on the compatibility of divine foreknowledge and free will with some attention 
given also to middle knowledge. 
Craig states his belief that "any reader who is willing to take the time and 
make an effort to evaluate the reasoning presented here will find it simple enough 
to grasp" (p. 12). He has, in fact, succeeded to a remarkable degree in giving 
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lucid, non-technical explanations with minimal sacrifice of philosophical accu-
racy; the book should be useful for students at an introductory level. At the same 
time, he has included some topics seldom discussed in connection with the 
foreknowledge issue, so that the book can be a source of new ideas and insights 
even for philosophers well versed in the topic. Of interest here is a series of 
chapters on "Rejection of Fatalism in Other Fields," which parallels his rejection 
of theological fatalism; the "other fields" are backward causation, time travel, 
precognition, and Newcomb's Paradox. The discussion of these topics does not 
add anything in a strict logical sense to the discussion of theological fatalism 
(nor does the author claim otherwise), but the topics are fascinating in their own 
right and the parallels drawn are illuminating. Also of interest is Craig's discus-
sion, at various points throughout the book, of the contrast between the A-theory 
and the B-theory of time; he correctly notes that the choice one makes here 
places constraints on the possible solutions of the foreknowledge problem. Yet 
another merit of the book is Craig's placement of the issue solidly within a 
theological context, with attention to the role of divine omniscience in the life 
of faith. The down side of this is that he may be a bit too ready to take up the 
theological cudgels and belabor his opponents for unorthodoxy. 
But the book has faults as well as merits. One small but important omission 
is his failure to provide either a formal definition or an explicit discussion of 
the nature of free will; clearly the notion he has in mind is broadly libertarian, 
but the details are never spelled out. The notes are adequate, considering the 
nature of the work, but a large proportion of the works cited are from the 1960s 
and 1970s, with few from the 1980s, tending to create the (perhaps incorrect) 
impression that much of the research for the book was done several years ago. 
The more recent citations seem to follow a pattern in which Craig cites one or 
two sources that confirm his position, while ignoring those which take an opposing 
view. For example, on the "necessity of the past" ("hard and soft facts"), he 
cites what he rightly terms Freddoso's "brilliant study" (p. 81),1 but he ignores 
discussions by Fischer and others which have argued that such an analysis does 
not succeed in turning back theological fatalism. 2 Naturally not every relevant 
study can be cited in a brief popular work such as this, but the pattern followed 
by Craig creates a distinctly misleading impression of the current state of the 
philosophical discussion. 
This point connects with what may be an even more serious weakness: 
throughout the book Craig consistently expresses more confidence (not to say 
dogmatism) about the evident correctness of his positions than is warranted by 
his evidence and arguments. In his first two chapters setting out the biblical 
doctrine of omniscience, Craig reaches standard Arminian conclusions: God 
foreknows all but does not predestine everything which happens, and human 
free will is not compromised. But the reader is led to suppose that this is the 
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only viable way of reading the relevant biblical passages. The view that we have 
here an ultimate paradox, irresolvable by human reason, is not even mentioned, 
though I should think this view would be quite difficult to refute on biblical 
grounds. And the Calvinistic view of absolute sovereignty and predestination is 
introduced only as one of two "Denials of the Biblical Doctrine"! Later chapters 
are peppered with remarks such as "the argument for theological fatalism is 
simply fallacious" (p. 74), "It seems that the fatalists' final gambit has failed" 
(p. 82), and the like. The current state of the discussion of this topic simply 
does not warrant such smug assurance, and the reader who receives the impression 
that it does is being misled. Accuracy and due humility alike require that one's 
own view on this issue (whatever that view may be) should be presented as one 
possible (and favored) resolution of the problem, one which however has impres-
sive rivals and is also confronted with difficulties at various points. 
In view of space limitations, only one substantive issue can be addressed: 
How is it that God is able to know future free actions? Craig states (rightly, in 
my opinion), that "The Christian cannot be expected to explain the actual way 
that God foreknows future free events; all the Christian has to do is suggest 
some possible way" (p. 119). I shall discuss the first of the two "possible ways" 
he considers, namely innate knowledge. (The other way, middle knowledge, 
raises questions too complex for discussion here.) 
Of interest is Craig's reason for rejecting another way that some have thought 
possible. Some writers hold that God's beliefs about a future event can be 
retrospectively brought about or caused by the event itself.3 But Craig accepts 
the A-theory of time, according to which temporal becoming is real and events 
of the future do not yet exist-thus, it seems impossible for God's present beliefs 
to be brought about by non-existent future events (see pp. 119-20). The truth 
may be, rather, that this knowledge of God's is innate: "God never learned or 
acquired his knowledge, but has eternally known an innate store of only and all 
true statements. Since future-tense statements are either true or false, God in 
knowing all true statements knows the future" (p. 123). And if we still insist on 
asking "How is it the case that God has innate knowledge?" that question "appears 
to be merely an expression of incredulity which requires no answer. God simply 
is that way, just as he is also omnipotent, necessary, morally perfect, and so 
forth .... That is part of what it means to be God, to be omniscient. And to 
ask how it is that God is omniscient is like asking how it is that vacuums are 
empty" (p. 123). 
But is innate knowledge a "possible way" for God to foreknow free actions? 
We have on the one hand God's beliefs about temporal events, beliefs he has 
held from all eternity. And on the other hand, we have the unfolding sequence 
of temporal events themselves. Furthermore, there is (by hypothesis) an exact 
correspondence between the events and the beliefs. Now the question is, What 
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explains this exact correspondence? How do we account for it? (I do not want 
to be told that "God is just that way." The question is not why God holds true 
beliefs in general, it is why he holds these particular beliefs. And since the 
beliefs in question are contingent, it is also contingent that God holds them; it 
is not "natural" for him to hold these beliefs, so some further explanation is 
indeed called for.) The following alternatives seem to exhaust the possibilities: 
(1) There is no explanation; it just happens for no reason that the beliefs 
and the events always correspond. 
(2) The beliefs are determined to be as they are by the events. 
(3) The events are determined to be as they are by the beliefs. 
(4) Both the events and the beliefs are determined to be as they are by 
some other factor. 
Of the four (1) seems to be out of the question; it is not just by good luck 
that God always gets things right. (2) is ruled out for Craig, as we have noted, 
because non-existent future events cannot cause things in the present. And he 
doesn't think our actions are caused by God's beliefs, so we are left with (4). 
What could the "other factor" be? Since the events thus determined include all 
contingent facts about the world, it would seem that this factor must be internal 
to God. Since the facts are contingent, the "factor" can't be essential to God; 
most likely, then, it is his decree, or his will, or something of the sort. In any 
case, it is evident that both (3) and (4) are inconsistent with the notion that any 
of the events known are free. So we return to the question: Is innate knowledge 
a possible way for God to foreknow free actions? There may be a good answer 
to this, but if there is Craig doesn't tell us what it is. 
In spite of the reservations noted, The Only Wise God is a worthwhile contribu-
tion both to the literature and to available teaching materials on this topic. The 
production and printing of the book by Baker are excellent, especially in view 
of the modest cost. Each chapter has a list of suggested further reading, and 
there is a brief but useful index. 
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